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Jim Hughes writes that the events of Bloody Sunday and the ‘shock’ of
concentrated violence in the early phase of the Northern Ireland conflict
reverberated and shaped the conflict for the following decades. However, the
violence also led to the start of a process that would result in the Good Friday
Agreement.
Today marks the fortieth anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Derry in 1972, when British
paratroopers shot dead 13 unarmed civilians and wounded another 13. They were
engaged in a protest march about internment without trial, introduced in August 1971, and to
highlight state infringements of the rule of law. The Widgery Tribunal enquiry of April 1972, which
exonerated the paratroopers, is now widely regarded as a state “whitewash”, or deeply flawed to
use parliamentary language.
The Saville Enquiry, a new investigation into Bloody Sunday agreed as part of the Northern Ireland
peace process and Good Friday Agreement of 1998, took twelve years and cost 200 million
pounds – one of the most expensive enquiries ever conducted by the UK. It’s devastating findings –
that the army had lost discipline and control and was fully responsible for the killings, that soldiers
had consistently lied – led Prime Minister David Cameron to state: “There is no doubt, there is
nothing equivocal, there are no ambiguities. What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified
and unjustifiable. It was wrong”. It was the first official apology for British state wrongdoing during the
twenty-five year “Long War” that was the Northern Ireland “Troubles”.  No British soldier, or other
official, has ever been charged with any crime for what occurred on Bloody Sunday.
It is generally accepted that the “shock” of concentrated violence in the early phase of the Northern
Ireland conflict – the period 1969-72 – reverberated and shaped the conflict for the next two and a
half decades. The breakdown of law and order, the collapse of the Unionist state in 1969, sparked a
wave of anti-catholic riots and pogroms in Belfast in which police and protestant mobs cooperated.
From this period emerged a newly vibrant form of “physical force” Irish nationalism under the
Provisional IRA, itself only founded in January 1970.
The polarization of positions between unionists and nationalists was only circumvented from the mid
1980s by bilateral British and Irish government agreements that were then steadily imposed in top-
down fashion on the protagonists in Northern Ireland, and reinforced by external pressures from the
USA and the EC/EU. The standard account holds that this process of “imposing” an agreement,
mainly on the unionists who resisted power-sharing, is what led to the “Belfast Agreement” of 1998.
Part of this standard account, from the very outset of the conflict, is that the British state acted as a
“broker” in the conflict. Home Secretary James Callaghan’s first major speech to the House of
Commons on the Army’s deployment in August 1969 stated that the first objective was to “keep the
peace between the communities”. This benign gloss was promoted by successive generations of
British politicians and senior military officers in a cross-party consensus on Northern Ireland, and
was also popularised by the British media. However, this does not explain why the violence
persisted for a generation, nor does it contribute to any prospect of critical thinking about the British
state’s role as a protagonist in the dirty war in Northern Ireland.
The radicalisation that occurred in Northern Ireland, in particular the rise of PIRA and its support
base in the catholic community, was largely reactive to the overreactions of the violent British state
security response in the period 1969-72. The British security response transformed what was, in
essence, a peaceful democratic movement for reform and civil rights into a formidable nationalist
cause. Moreover, the state violence was in character and form shaped by decades of British
military experience in repressing anticolonial movements.
There is no doubting the genuine sense of relief among catholics at the British government’s
decision to deploy the British Army on August 14-15 to “restore law and order”. Most accounts of
the violence in Northern Ireland accept that there was a “honeymoon” between nationalist/catholic
communities and the British Army in the immediate aftermath of the intervention. The consensus
dissipates over the question of what explains the breakdown of the “honeymoon,” and the nationalist
resurgence in the form of communal support for the PIRA insurgency.
There were a number of epiphenoma punctuating the radicalisation of the catholic community and
British journalists were acute observers of the trend in the early 1970s. Crude crowd control
technology, for example, such as CS gas, was used in massive quantities and represented a de
facto collective punishment on built up residential areas. From July 1970 the army shot petrol
bombers on sight, as so-called “rubber bullets” (baton rounds) and other riot gear became standard
issue only in late summer 1970. Many accounts see the Falls Road Curfew of early July 1970 as the
turning point. Imposed by the British Army on a catholic area of Belfast that had experienced the
brunt of the interethnic rioting in summer 1969, the curfew involved several thousand troops, a major
gun battle and the firing of hundreds of CS gas canisters in a small confined area of dilapidated
Victorian-era streets. Gerry Adams (later a commander of PIRA in Belfast), noted that the curfew
was a key event in both the expansion of PIRA and the legitimation of “physical force”.
Unionist academics, however, argue that the problem of spiralling violence was not due to heavy-
handed military tactics, but on the contrary, was the result of “softly-softly” British security policies
that ignored unionist fears and allowed a resurgence of the IRA. This position reflects that of the
Unionist political leadership in 1970, which pressured a reluctant Army command to “sort out”
catholic “No Go” areas.
The drift to nationalist violence in 1971 seems to be mainly explained as the result of a lack of
strategic thinking by the British Army over how to manage security, tactical blunders, inappropriate
military/policing crowd control technology, and the failure to speedily address catholic grievances.
What is generally overlooked in these accounts is that the British Army was historically a
counterinsurgency army with a colonial mindset and this experience shaped its counterinsurgency
strategy in Northern Ireland.
Colonial counterinsurgency, historically, was practiced at some distance from the oversight of
democratic governments in the UK, usually against non-Whites, and well beyond the glare of
independent investigative journalists. Northern Ireland’s geographical proximity to Britain and
Europe, and its accessibility to the mass media, would present a number of challenges for
managing civil disorder there. Many of the senior commanders of the British Army that served in
Northern Ireland in the critical period of 1970-72 and thereafter were leading practitioners of what
we might term the “British model” of counterinsurgency.
A particularly significant figure in this regard was Brigadier Frank Kitson, who assumed overall
command of British forces in Belfast in early 1970 until his removal by Secretary of State William
Whitelaw in April 1972 in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday. The British Army strategy and tactics that
were employed in this critical period were, by and large, those that Kitson had formulated from
 lesson-learning from the decades of British colonial “small wars.” Kitson was among a small group
of European military officers (mainly British and French) who advocated a population-centric
approach to counterinsurgency. This was packaged in an information war as “winning hearts and
minds” and as wars “for the people.”
In theory, this should involve resolving political grievances and bringing development and economic
opportunities. In practice, the core tenet was control through repression and coercion. As Kitson put
: “conditions can be made reasonably uncomfortable for the population as a whole in order to
provide an incentive for a return to normal life and to act as a deterrent towards a resumption of the
campaign”. He also stressed intelligence gathering on a communal level through systematic search,
mass arrest and screening operations, as well as “countergangs” or “pseudogangs,” which could
infiltrate or deceive insurgents in undercover operations.
From early 1970, in addition to the routinization of the security measures outlined above, the British
Army also started to develop its card index profiles of every catholic family in the working class
areas of North and West Belfast through systematic interrogation of each household. The
securitization tactics were not applied to either protestant areas or, indeed, middle class areas with
large catholic populations. Over time the British Army and security agencies would develop a
systematic computerization of personal and vehicle records.
Other counterinsurgency experiences, including recent ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggest that
there is a fundamental flaw in the capacity of the military to adopt tactics to win “hearts and minds”
of communities, unless it is merely a euphemism for coercion. All the evidence from Northern Ireland
and other campaigns demonstrates that counterinsurgency strategy is nearly always about the
coercion of communities. It is at the tactical interface between soldiers and communities  where
military brutality and the consequent alienation of communities occurs.
It was precisely at the tactical level, that the evidence in the public domain suggests, things went
wrong on Bloody Sunday. Colonel Derek Wilford (leader of the paratroopers on Bloody Sunday)
attracted much of the blame in the Saville report, but it was Kitson who set the counterinsurgency
strategy which led to Bloody Sunday. Indeed, as reported in the memoirs of General Mike Jackson,
Kitson fumed at commanders who he perceived to be too soft, and it was he whodebriefed and
admonished Wilford on the evening of 30 January 1972 because he “didn’t go on and sort the whole
bloody mess out”.
There is a view among some British security experts that Northern Ireland is an example of “good
practice”, where a counterinsurgency was won. We have to ask ourselves whether a twenty-five year
violent conflict, by its very duration, can be considered a success or a strategic failure? Bloody
Sunday should be seen as part of a counterinsurgency strategy that was counterproductive, and
which escalated the violence and alienated the nationalist community from British policy. There is no
evil without something good, according to Pliny the Elder. Bloody Sunday is almost universally
recognised as a great wrong, but from it came the role of Derry businessman Brendan Duddy as
the back channel (“The Contact”) between the PIRA and the British government – a small
development which steadily gathered momentum and became the peace process of the 1990s.
 Please read our comments policy before posting
About the author
James Hughes is Professor of Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics, UK.
He specialises in the analysis of contemporary political violence and terrorism, including internal
armed conflicts and civil wars that pose international security challenges. His areas of expertise
range from the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, to the Balkans, and Northern Ireland.
You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. Book Review: The Destructors: The Story of Northern Ireland’s Lost Peace Process
2. Book Review: Lost in Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in Northern Ireland
3. How will Northern Ireland vote in 2010?
4. The demise of Northern Ireland’s first power-sharing administration offers valuable insights for
conflict resolution and policy worldwide.
